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… [W]e often forgot how much more thoughtless and dangerous people in 
power can be when, driven by fear, they choose to arrogate to themselves 
the prerogative of declaring the exception. 
― Partha Chatterjee
In recent years, there has been a growth in the literature on the concept and 
practice of the “American Empire.” Referring to empire, many scholars and 
journalists have emphasized the neo-imperial characteristic of the United States. 
After the Bush Administration sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of 
a “war on terrorism,” American foreign policy has revived the memory of an old-
style colonial empire.  In opposition, G. John Ikenberry argues that the notion of 
American empire is misleading, since the United States has embraced democratic 
rules and values in its diplomacy and national security considerations.  His neo-
liberal argument suggests that U.S. leadership and security presence in the Asia-
Pacific, including Japan, significantly contributes to the peace and stability of this 
region and the world. 
The purpose of this paper is not to decide whether the United States should 
be described as an empire, but rather to critically assess an assumption upon 
which the U.S. liberal strategy has been grounded.  In this article, I particularly 
question Ikenberry’s influential proposition by examining the internal dissonance 
of the Japanese situation in the context of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. 
First, I provide a brief overview of Ikenberry’s the perspective from which an 
international order led by the United States is stable and mutually agreeable. 
Second, I develop the argument that the U.S. security strategy accelerates the 
shrinking of the democratic sphere in its relationship with Japan.  The third section 
considers the U.S.-Japanese policy cooperation and internal conflicts within 
it, especially focusing on the case of Okinawa.  I conclude that the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance represents the way in which a liberal state betrays its original 
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principle once it has spread it beyond its border.  Ikenberry’s denial of the concept 
of American empire incorrectly eliminates this important aspect of U.S. activity 
on forming alliances. 
Ikenberry’s argument on the United States
G. John Ikenberry is a liberal strategist who specializes in U.S. foreign policy. 
Whilst teaching at Georgetown, Princeton, and Pennsylvania Universities, he has 
held a post at the State Department and the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace.  He is a well-known, influential scholar in Japan, especially as an editor-
in-chief of the International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (the English journal of 
the Japan Association of International Relations).  He has conducted a multi-year 
project on “United States and Japanese Collaboration on Regional Security and 
Governance” in collaboration with Takashi Inoguchi with financial support from 
the U.S.-Japan Foundation and the Committee for Global Partnership.
His argument on empire appears to be a response to the enormous popularity 
of the concept of American empire.1  A widespread tendency to label the United 
States as an empire derives mainly from three aspects of the second term of the 
Bush Administration.  First, the U.S. attack on Iraq failed to gain an institutional 
agreement such as that from the United Nations Security Council.  Second, U.S. 
owned interests in oil in the Middle East seemed to be an important motivation for 
this military intervention.  Third, when the target of the U.S. anti-terror war was 
extended from al-Qaeda and the Taliban to Iraq, U.S. foreign policy unavoidably 
acquired the tone of cultural imperialism.  Even though Bush aims to boost 
morale among the U.S. troops for the smooth democratization of Iraq, promoting 
democratic values helps intensify an anti-U.S. sentiment in the Islamic world. 
Ikenberry himself argues in 2002 that the new ideas within the Bush 
Administration after September 11 put at risk the U.S. legacy “to exercise power 
within alliance and multinational frameworks, which made its power and agenda 
more acceptable to allies and other key states around the world.”2 This is based 
on his acceptance of a view that any power that disregards the interdependence of 
the international system would endanger its liberal values and global influence in 
future.3  He also suggests that the recurrence of debate over an American empire 
is “an attempt to make sense of the new unipolar reality” because the United 
States possessed “near-monopoly” in terms of military force after the break-
up of the Soviet Union.4  However, he ardently argues that, despite the sudden 
change of American policy after September 11, the U.S. liberal characteristic has 
not been changed.  For Ikenberry, this new international order is consistent with 
the principle of multilateralism and rule-based negotiation.  He explains the U.S. 
unipolar order from three aspects: 
First, the United States provided public goods ― particularly the extension 
of security and the support for an open trade regime ― in exchange for the 
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cooperation of other states.  Second, power in the U.S. system is exercised through 
rules and institutions;  power politics still exist, but arbitrary and indiscriminate 
power is reigned in.  Finally, weaker states in the U.S.-led order are given “voice 
opportunities” ― informal access to the policymaking processes of the United States 
and the intergovernmental institutions that make up the international system.5
Even though the United States has powerful military forces and economic 
influences, Ikenberry emphasizes that the order led by the United States is a far 
more stable and less coercive venture for the promotion of democracy.  Therefore, 
this country is fundamentally different from previous empires in the nineteenth 
century and the first half of the twentieth century.  It can be best understood not 
by the concept of empire but by hegemony, primarily because this country is an 
unprecedented state which rejects the exercising of imperialistic power to which 
previous empires subscribed.
Along this line of argument, Ikenberry values Niall Ferguson’s reading of 
the United States.  Ferguson has considered the role of an empire to be important 
in maintaining the stability of an international order.6  He understands that the 
political aspirations of the British Empire included not only the prosperity of 
its own country but also the promotion of peace and development in other parts 
of the world.  The strong emphasis on the positive legacy of the British Empire 
is rather bizarre, even though Britain has a liberal and moral tradition from the 
age of Adam Smith.7  Yet Ferguson describes the United States as a similar kind 
of liberal power and highlights the U.S. global role that would enforce order 
and stability.  Ikenberry basically supports this view, even though he believes 
that, instead of a “liberal empire,” “liberal hegemony” is an appropriate term to 
describe U.S. power.  For him, it is the U.S. liberal thinking that has sustained 
the post-1945 world order as a pluralistic society.  This is fundamentally different 
from the old-style empires that use coercive forces for the maintenance of order.
Does Ikenberry then completely deny the imperialist legacy of the United 
States?  Indeed, as Cox argues, the memory of the Founding Fathers apparently 
shows that the United States acquired other people’s land;  American Manifest 
Destiny became a convenient guidance for the invasion of some regions in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific.8  How does Ikenberry see the imperialist legacy of the 
United States?  
The United States has a long history of pursuing crude imperial policies, particularly 
in Latin America and the Middle East.  But America’s relations with Europe, Japan, 
Russia and China are not best described as imperial ― and this is true even when the 
term empire is modified with neo-, liberal, or democratic.  It is a political order built 
on ‘liberal hegemonic’ bargains, diffuse  reciprocity, public goods provision, and an 
unprecedented array of intergovernmental institutions and working relationships.  
The advanced democracies operate within a ‘security community’ where the use 
or threat of force is unthinkable.  This is not empire ― it is an American-led open 
democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent.9
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Ikenberry admits that the United States has made an imperialistic intervention in 
Latin America and the Middle East, but not in any other region.  In this context, 
Japan is one of the countries that have a partnership with the United States.10 
He argues that “Japan may be a subordinate security partner, but the U.S.-Japan 
alliance also allows Tokyo to forgo a costly buildup of military capacity that would 
destabilize East Asia.”11 For this reason, even though Japan has an alternative to 
ask the United States to leave, Japan has taken an autonomous decision to be a 
subordinate partner of the United States.12  Consequently the U.S. alliance system 
creates a “stable, open political space.”13 In another paper, he also argues that the 
U.S.-Japan relationship “solved regional security dilemmas by creating restraints 
on the resurgence of Japanese military power.” Put differently, “American power 
is seen less as a source of domination and more as a useful tool.”14
As Ikenberry describes it, can one be so sure about the support and effects of 
the U.S.-Japan relationship?  Is there any doubt that the United States provides 
a secure, democratic world order with sufficient consent of its partners?  The 
crucial question is:  who actually has “voice opportunities” without a feeling of 
being threatened?  In the next two sections, I aim to examine the international and 
domestic implications of this U.S.-Japan alliance relationship.  First, I suggest 
that the Japanese engagement in the U.S. security strategy may destabilize the 
order of this East Asian region.  Second, I examine the development of the U.S.-
Japan security alliance, particularly focusing on the way in which this bilateral 
relationship has developed in respect of Okinawa without a satisfactory level of 
mutual consultation.
Asset and liability of U.S. presence in East Asia
Ikenberry argues that the U.S. presence in East Asia helps to stabilize this region. 
However, it is not so clear whether or not the U.S.-Japan security alliance truly 
helps to create a “stable, open political space” in East Asia, especially because of 
the very nature of this region.  Unlike Europe, East Asian countries do not have 
a real political network that could restrain any military conflicts.  Since there is 
little institutional framework in terms of security, bilateral treaties have been the 
dominant mode of protection in this region.  This tendency largely continues to 
exist, as can be seen in the East Asian Summit in 2005, which did not produce 
any particular outcome in terms of security cooperation.  In this context, the 
presence of the U.S. troops is supposed to deter any regional power from taking 
military actions.  Amongst several alliance relationships, the U.S.-Japan security 
agreement has been considered to be a vital source of East Asian security, especially 
during the Cold War era.  The Pentagon continues to believe that the U.S. alliance 
system largely contributes to the “containment” of the China.
However, the pre-emptive strategy of the United States risks creating a 
security dilemma, that is, a close connection with this military power would 
provoke reactions from the regional states.  According to DiFilippo, “Because 
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the U.S.-Japan security relationship is an alliance between the two biggest 
economies in the world with a combined military power that would be difficult to 
challenge, it is increasingly being perceived by China, North Korea, and Russia 
as a destabilizing or at least threatening, regional force.”15 Despite the liberal 
outlook of the United States, there is no obvious limit in terms of when and how 
to use force in a particular situation.  The maintenance and further increase of 
military forces and armaments under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty may escalate 
unnecessary tension in East Asia.
In addition, it is also doubtful that the U.S. military presence in Japan and 
other parts of East Asia truly contains the resurgence of Japanese militarization. 
In fact, Japan has developed its own military power whilst cooperating with 
the Unites States.  In the process of strengthening the security alliance with 
Washington after the end of the Cold War, Tokyo has significantly expanded 
the role of its military in the international arena, by completing the review of 
the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1996, commencing the 
Ballistic Missile Defense program with the United States, and passing anti-
terrorist legislation in the Diet.  The LDP considers revising Article 9, the war-
renouncing clause of the Constitution, and giving more autonomy to military 
activities by replacing the Defense Agency with the Defense Ministry.  Despite 
the U.S. military presence in Japan, this political and military transformation in 
the framework of the U.S.-Japan security relationship will destabilize East Asia 
by escalating tensions with China and posing serious questions for the defensive 
character of Japan’s alliance role.
Facing the rapid increase of Chinese military capabilities, widespread concerns 
are focused on the Taiwan Strait.  In 1996 the United States sent its troops to 
Taiwan when China threatened the democracy of Taiwan by commencing a 
large-scale military exercise in the Taiwan Strait.  Since then, the Taiwan issue 
has become a source of tension and U.S. conservatives have described the 
perceived threat of China.  In this context, whether or not the United States will 
intervene in a conflict if ever China attacks Taiwan is the most contentious issue. 
According to Auer and Kotani, “The US-Japan alliance is a double-edged sword. 
A strong alliance discourages Beijing, while encouraging Taipei.  A weak alliance 
discourages Taipei but encourages Beijing.  Therefore, the alliance should not 
allow either side to take advantage of it, and both governments should strongly 
demand the maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and oppose any 
unilateral change by Taipei and Beijing.”16 Their analysis suggests that if the 
balance of the region is broken by any misjudgment or miscalculation of the 
United States, Japan would be further committed to an unwanted conflict between 
China and the United States.  Therefore, one has a good reason to doubt whether 
the U.S.-Japan relationship is the best way to contribute to the security and 
stability of this region.
Similarly, the possibility of military intervention by the United States may 
easily stimulate North Korea to accelerate its nuclear programs as the most 
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appropriate means of deterrence.  According to Smith, the general perception of 
U.S. policy-makers that North Korea is either mad or bad considerably endangers 
the peaceful negotiation process with North Korea.17  It was symbolic that the 
1994 nuclear crisis was settled down not by the assertive policy of the Pentagon 
but by the ex-President Jimmy Carter’s “track-two” diplomacy.18  This means that 
the U.S. strategic analysis is not always correct or effective, especially concerning 
states whose society is relatively unknown, closed, and culturally distant from 
that of western liberal states.  For this reason, blind faith in the United States can 
lead the allied partners such as Japan to be entrapped by conflicts, which could be 
otherwise avoided.
In a nutshell, it is unclear whether the alliance system really contributes to the 
peace and stability of East Asia.  There is obviously the downside of the alliance, 
especially when the United States aims to shape the structure of this system in its 
own interests.  Although Ikenberry does not mention this security dilemma when 
he defends the role of the United States, it is imperative to acknowledge the wider 
meaning of U.S. global power in the region.  For this double-edged nature of the 
U.S.-Japan security alliance, each development of the alliance has gained serious 
attention from other East Asian countries.
Japanese dissonance and Okinawa
For the Japanese population, the U.S.-Japan security alliance has given cold 
comfort as a means to diminish threat and instability.  After the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty became effective in 1952, 
Japan as a legally independent state committed itself to a security alliance with the 
United States.  Ever since, Japanese security policy has been built on the legacy 
of the U.S. occupation period of 1945―1951:  Japan’s “peace constitution” and 
its defense forces.  The former was prescribed by the American initiative in the 
Government Section of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers.19  The latter 
originated in the National Police Reserve, which was created after the United 
States demanded Japan to rebuild military forces for the defense of free Asia 
against the Soviet Union and China.  Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru saw this 
apparent contradiction not as a liability but as an asset to save his economically 
devastated country.  On the one hand, he accepted the U.S. defense strategy as 
an inexpensive means to defend Japan, but on the other, he used the Constitution 
as an excuse to restrain a military build-up.  Yoshida, as a pragmatist, writes that 
“the maintenance of close bonds of friendship with the United States, based upon 
a deep mutuality of interests, must be one of the pillars of Japan’s fundamental 
policy and always remain so.”20 This so-called Yoshida doctrine became the main 
policy of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party for the following decades.
During the Cold War, left-wing politicians and pacifist scholars criticized 
the LDP’s cooperative approach to the U.S. “containment” strategy towards 
communism.  Although neither the Japanese Socialist Party nor the Japanese 
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Communist Party could manage to replace the LDP, they helped reject any 
attempt to amend the Constitution.  Both parties attacked the LDP’s cooperation 
with the United States throughout the Cold War era primarily because strenuous 
opposition to any commitment to war was deeply rooted in post-war Japan.  The 
climax of this internal tension was probably at the time of the Vietnam War.  A 
number of mass protests against this war questioned the legitimacy of U.S. forces 
sent from bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan to North Vietnam without any 
prior consultation with Japan.  It may be for the first time in Japanese history 
that such a massive scale of civil protest was organized by a voluntary group 
like Beheiren [Citizens’ Federation for Peace in Vietnam].  Even though the LDP 
continued to occupy the ruling seat, the protests reached a significant level that 
restrained further Japanese cooperation with the United States in the 1960s.21
The disagreement over the U.S.-Japan security relationship is particularly 
significant in regard to Okinawa.  The U.S.-Japan alliance has created an excessive 
burden on Okinawa since 1945.  From 1945 to 1972 Okinawa was under U.S. 
occupation.  Even after Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972, approximately seventy 
percent of all U.S. military facilities in Japan were concentrated on the land of 
Okinawa.  Because of this military occupation, Okinawa’s economic structure 
was heavily dependent on the U.S. bases.  Any restructuring of the U.S. strategic 
position certainly affected Japanese foreign policy whose posture tended to be 
subordinate to the United States as the guarantor of Japanese security.  However, 
the effect of change appears more explicitly in Okinawa.
The “partnership” between the United States and Japan was seriously 
questioned in September 1995 when three U.S. servicemen abducted and raped a 
young girl in Okinawa.  This incident ignited the rage of the Okinawan residents 
and drove the largest demonstration (85,000 protestors) in Okinawa since 1972, 
which consequently raised nation-wide voices against the U.S. forces in Japan. 
Gabe points out the significant lack of Japanese-side initiative in handling 
Okinawa’s problems:  “perhaps those political leaders find it difficult to change 
their perception that, so long as they follow in the wake of decisions by the U.S. 
government, they need not have any purpose of their own in terms of diplomatic 
and national security policies.”22 In this sense, the Japanese government’s stance 
is a “dependent variable” in negotiations with the United States.
Despite the institutional development of the Special Action Committee 
on Okinawa (SACO) for the coordination of Okinawa’s issues, Okinawa has 
continued to suffer from its subordination to the U.S. military.  More importantly, 
the democratic decision-making process continues to be ignored by Tokyo.  The 
most recent contentious issue was over the relocation of the functions of Futenma 
airbase to a new offshore heliport in Henoko.  Since ‘relocation’ is fundamentally 
different from ‘reduction’, citizens formed a grassroots opposition movement 
to this plan.  As a result, Nago City, which had already negotiated with Tokyo, 
reluctantly held a plebiscite.  The result was the rejection of the heliport plan 
(52.86% against, 45.33% for this plan).  Nevertheless, Mayor Higa Tetsuya 
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pledged his city’s support for the plan and then resigned.23 Ota Masahide, the 
governor of Okinawa, endorsed the plebiscite and skillfully attracted the media’s 
attention by contacting Washington officials directly and refusing to sign off the 
enforced leasing of Okinawa’s land.
However, Ota’s effort did not succeed.  He eventually had to leave office 
when he lost his support in 1998.  Ota explains that this is because of the 
politicization of economy.  He writes:  “residents think that although the base 
relocation and economic development are separate issues as the government has 
repeatedly emphasized, the two issues have been actually linked before they knew 
it, because the government is proceeding with its plan for relocation as if it were 
a quid pro quo for economic development.”24 According to the public opinion 
poll, most Okinawans expressed their support for Ota’s policy, whilst they were 
worried about the direction of Okinawa’s economy.25
The contradiction between the rejection of outside authority and a desire for 
economic development has not lessened.  Without having a serious discussion 
with the Okinawa government and the residents of the region, the Japanese and 
U.S. governments reached an agreement over a heliport plan in Henoko.  The 
Japanese government decided on the relocation with the United States prior to 
consultation with Okinawa, and afterwards, demanded that Okinawa Governor 
Inamine Keiichi accept it.26
It is critical to ensure that agreements between the United States and Japan 
have passed through a “joint decision-making” process.  Regarding the U.S.-Japan 
relationship, institutional decision-making processes have been underdeveloped 
so far.  For the sake of security strategy, the United States and Japan have largely 
ignored Okinawa’s public opinion.  Despite a plan to empower Okinawa’s 
economy, this region has been largely disempowered by its political constraints. 
Okinawa’s case symbolically suggests that the Okinawan people have carried 
an excessive burden on their shoulder against their will.  It is doubtful that the 
political measure to deal with the Okinawa problem is truly a rule-based and 
consultative one.
Ikenberry dismisses the dissonance between Okinawa, Japan, and the United 
States primarily because his focus is limited to inter-state relationships.  His 
suggestion has been built upon a logic shared by the Japanese central government 
that the alliance has benefited Japan’s national security and economy.  Based on 
this “Japanese” support of the U.S.-Japan alliance, he asserts that an American 
empire is not a correct expression.  However, it is hard to see clear evidence that 
the United States is the exception in taking a consensual approach in comparison 
with the empires in the past.  Chatterjee argues that colonies have been disciplined 
either by force or by culture.27 Both an empire and a liberal hegemony share not 
only a strong military force to coerce its decisions but also an influential normative 
power to decide what is right.  Thus, unlike Ikenberry’s proposition, the concepts 
of empire and liberal hegemony are not exclusive but form an amalgamation.  The 
history of normalizing the U.S.-Japan alliance is inseparable from the history of 
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empire.
Ikenberry’s liberal strategy and beyond
This article has examined Ikenberry’s influential view of the United States as 
a liberal hegemony that helps stabilize the international and regional order.  I 
particularly focus on what he regards as the partnership between Japan and the 
United States.  According to Ikenberry, the U.S.-Japan alliance is an assurance 
that the United States has enhanced security and order by rule-based negotiations 
and mutual consent.  By rejecting the label of empire, he seems to overthrow 
a skeptical view that perceives the U.S. alliance as a destabilizing force in the 
region.  His arguments rest on two assumptions:  first, that the US military 
presence and leading role undoubtedly remains important for the peace and 
stability of the world, and second, that the Japanese government’s approval of the 
alliance is the result of a mutual agreement.
Ikenberry’s argument sounds plausible, especially at a time when the Koizumi 
administration emphasizes that Japan is also intent on the improvement of its 
security alliance framework and seeks a more assertive foreign policy.  However, 
Japan is taking the risk of increasing instability within the region by placing 
itself firmly in the U.S. alliance system, and of weakening its democratic process 
through non-representational decision-making.  Okinawa has been forced to stay 
at the frontline of U.S. military strategy and to obey both the Japanese central 
government and the United States.  Although it is the Japanese government that 
has the responsibility to take the voice of Okinawa into account, the United 
States has undeniably helped to impose its military strategy without a democratic 
and open consultation.  The people of Okinawa still seek a public arena for 
“voice opportunities” to express their opinion on the forced leasing of Okinawan 
territory.  In Ikenberry’s counter-argument to the concept of an American empire, 
Japan’s political conflicts and the tension caused by American liberal strategy is 
overlooked and buried.
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